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                    Joking A Part: The Social Performance of Folly 
The greatest artists of all time had a knack for playfulness, for seeing life inside of things. Too 
much seriousness creates art with a message but rarely creates great art. There is no 
scientific evidence that seriousness leads to greater growth and maturity, or insight into the 
human condition than playfulness.  (Lederach, 2005: 160) 
 
[slide 1: Resistance is the Secret of Joy] 
Introduction 
My proposal in this lecture will be that folly is a crucial ingredient for social 
health, be it in the life of every individual or of nations. Folly is the lubricant 
that reduces friction in families, in communities, in the world. Play is closely 
linked to folly and, in playful mood, we often excuse our follies by asserting 
that we are ‘only fooling around’. Play is one of the first activities of a child’s 
exploration of the world that, later, becomes ritualised in the form of plays. 
Play also means flexibility, shape-shifting, as when we speak of the play in 
materials such as young timber. Ever since the species started to form social 
groups, evidence has appeared suggesting that specific figures, self-appointed 
or elected, performed the function of the fool in order to draw attention to the 
contradictions, inequalities and injustices that make up the stuff of daily 
existence. Down the ages they have subverted common sense, assaulted 
untested assumptions and travestied sacred truths so that we are denied the 
comforts of stagnation and unthinking recourse to the status quo. As the old 
adage has it, it is not the unanswered questions but the unquestioned 
answers, that we should fear. One of the many pernicious effects of the spread 
of the neoliberal version of globalisation has been the closing down of spaces 
where these alternative visions might flourish. Once upon a time the market-
place attracted all manner of people engaged in a great variety of political, 
social, cultural and economic transactions. Today the market has been reduced 
to buying and selling in a monoculture where the human being is just another 
commodity and digital technologies keep us trading all day, every day. 
In former times places of worship and places of business existed hard by each 
other and each had their allotted spaces on the calendar. Holy days were time 
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off from the business of work, allowing people the freedom to express their 
humanity through culture, sport and all the other myriad ways of being playful, 
as they morphed into holidays. Today, under the regime of austerity – the 
latest strategy for transferring wealth from the poor to the rich – we live in a 
perpetual Lent with its traditional prohibitions on manifestations of play. There 
are acute dangers in repressing the playful, improvisatory aspects of our 
psyche for too long. Like cultural and bio-diversity, once varieties of being 
human are lost, they cannot be recovered and with their loss we reduce our 
capacity to adapt to the ever-changing environment and thereby our chances 
of surviving as a species, once notable for its adaptability. In English we speak 
of being ‘deadly serious’, not of being ‘deadly playful’. The serious application 
of neoliberal monoculture will kill us all, unless redeemed through folly to 
laugh at itself, perceive its limitations, and rehearse alternatives. 
[slide 2: symbolic raven] 
Of Ravens and Coyotes 
Playful, irreverent and frequently irrational, folly at its most serious detonates 
confrontation with both society and the self. It constantly seeks out a persona 
or mask through which it can disclaim what it articulates. Therefore theatre is 
its natural habitat and dialogue its preferred mode for teasing out 
contradictions and puncturing the closed ideologies of monologue. Beyond the 
easy, external targets of satire, the poetics of fooling operate at the heart of 
the body politic, questioning the cherished orthodoxies of correctness and 
peering around the edges of our most deep-rooted myths. The earliest records 
of the cultural life of human societies reveal the presence of figures whose role 
is to provoke laughter by depicting the absurdity of the human condition; not 
just the more obvious and excessive vanities and pretensions of the rich and 
the powerful but that very absurdity which confronts an ever-changing, time-
bound species. These figures and the opinions typically  associated with them 
are constantly placed in opposition to the dominant discourses of the historical 
moments in which they occur and yet express this opposition through devices 
that enable them to escape from the trap of a counter-discourse. In 
Foucauldian terms they are not seeking an authority for their position and 
therefore are not concerned with the discourses of power through which all 
human life is otherwise conducted. [slide 3: Grillo as shaman] These figures, real or 
more usually fictional, are inevitably outsiders who can only articulate their 
views by being detached from the societies upon which they comment. 
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Frequently they exist in a kind of twilight of the semi-detached, 
uncompromised by allegiances to families, careers, ideologies, material gain 
and all those other considerations   that contrive to cloud unbiased judgement. 
They are described as foolish by those who live by worldly criteria for denying 
themselves opportunities for prosperity and advancement. This quality of folly 
can be a mask worn for both disguise and protection or an essential element of 
personality such as naiveté or simplicity which gives to the possessor a capacity 
to see differently; typically to transcend the ego. Due to their limited interest 
in the material world such characters are often felt to be in closer communion 
with the spirit world than their fellow mortals. Some fools are professionals, 
earning their living (such as it is) by their wits. Some are ‘naturals’, foolish 
without artifice and unable to be anything else. Many inhabit an intermediate 
space between these positions, slipping between premeditated and 
spontaneous folly; at times worldly fools; at other times holy fools. Again, this 
shape-changing, intangible quality of the trickster has made them especially 
suitable for the medium of theatre where rapid changes of role, disguise and 
the tricks of illusion are the stock in trade.  
 
Whether in life or art, and in many circumstances the demarcation between 
the two is difficult to maintain with any confidence, figures going under a 
variety of names but manifesting congruent characteristics have been 
identified across the whole range of world cultures which have evolved 
without contact with each other. From the Vidusaka described in the Kama 
Sutra to the Trickster of the Winnebago people of North America, from the 
Ananse spider trickster of West Africa to the court-jester of medieval Europe  
‘Manifestly we are here in the presence of a figure and a theme or themes 
which have had a special and permanent appeal and an unusual attraction for 
mankind from the very beginnings of civilization.’ (Radin, 1956: xxiii). [slide 4: 
raven & coyote] The raven of the Haida or the coyote of the Lakota embodies this 
role; simultaneously parasitic and dependent upon human societies. Some vital 
part of what constitutes humanity is bound up in the notion of being able to 
laugh at ourselves. So precious is this capacity that its operation is often not 
left to chance but formalised in both social structures and artistic forms. A 
significant aspect of this operation is the placing of laughter and those who 
cause it at the very centre of the body politic. In former times the fool, clown 
or idiot has occupied a privileged position as the intimate of the most powerful 
person in the nation, the tribe or the village. [slide 5: UVic Feste] If laughter is a 
necessary function for any human being, it appears even more important that 
those who control the lives of others should be exposed to it on a regular 
basis. Through laughter such guardians of our economic, social, moral and 
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cultural life can be warned of the dangers into which they may run if they take 
themselves too seriously and believe in the infallibility of their own 
judgements. Laughter asserts another way of seeing; often the view from the 
grassroots which can offer a different reality from that observed from the 
palace, the pulpit, the committee room or the television studio. 
 
Ambiguity lies at the core of the fool’s representation: at once holy, heroic and 
idiotic; both more and less than the rest of humankind. Attempts to categorise 
are doomed since it is a fundamental part of the make-up of the fool to defy 
categories. Lewis Hyde describes this characteristic in terms of border crossing: 
  
In short, trickster is a boundary-crosser. Every group has its edge, its sense of in and out, and 
trickster is always there, at the gates of the city and the gates of life, making sure there is 
commerce. He also attends the internal boundaries by which groups articulate their social 
life. We constantly distinguish – right and wrong, sacred and profane, clean and dirty, male 
and female, young and old, living and dead – and in every case trickster will cross the line 
and confuse the distinction….Trickster is the mythic embodiment of ambiguity and 
ambivalence, doubleness and duplicity, contradiction and paradox. (Hyde, 1998: 7) 
 
The fool is the only person whom a society can permit to challenge that which 
it holds most sacred because he carries within his representation the default 
assurance that it is ‘only the fool’ who has uttered such blasphemies. And yet 
once uttered, the words are out and with them the possibility of the need to 
reassess whether these sacred truths still carry authority. The challenges 
reinvigorate society either by confirming the potency of existing values or by 
demonstrating the necessity to revise them. 
 
Ash Tuesday, Shrove Wednesday 
 
[slide 6: Battle between Carnival and Lent] 
When Pieter Brueghel the Elder painted the Fight between Carnival and Lent 
sometime around 1559, it was already an act of recuperation if not nostalgia. 
The degree to which late medieval European societies processed reality in 
terms of such a fight can never be accurately measured but it is evident that 
their Renaissance or early modern successors deployed the trope regularly as a 
means of understanding earlier patterns of existence. The manner of 
Brueghel’s depiction suggests that he was concerned not merely to represent 
one of the dominant ways in which human existence was understood but 
rather to present an ironic version of the struggle. Although the fight is the 
foreground and chief action of the painting, it is neither the highlight, nor the 
point to which the eye of the spectator is drawn. Both church on the right and 
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tavern on the left emerge out of the gloom against which the fight is played 
out. The joyless parade of the stock emblems of Carnival and Lent – meat and 
fish, body and soul – suggests that it may be time to develop different ways of 
responding to the demands of the flesh and the spirit. Many of those shown 
are taking no interest in the fight and are engaged in their own activities, 
including making and watching some sort of theatrical performance around the 
figure of a green man or Robin Hood (top left). The visual focus of the painting 
is a fool with his back to the proceedings, leading a man and a woman away 
from the fight. Folly, it would appear, has no truck with the binary opposition 
that had dominated so much of medieval life in the preceding centuries. It is, 
however, important to note that the artist could rely upon the spectator’s 
understanding of this struggle because it had become such a familiar device for 
processing  cultural life. The Fall of Adam resulted in a punishment of constant 
toil in this life which can only be made endurable by the consolations of the 
flesh; consolations which imperil mankind’s chances of being redeemed on the 
Day of Judgement. The Catholic Church’s principal way of addressing this 
contradiction in the medieval period was by eliding holy day with holiday so 
that time off from toil could become both a moment for the honouring of the 
saints and an opportunity  to satisfy the needs of the body. Work is not present 
in Brueghel’s painting because he is depicting the holiday balance between 
Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday; that place in the calendar that presents 
most vividly the contrary impulses informing life on earth. 
 
The battle between the fixed positions of Carnival and Lent, once reinterpreted 
with foolishness, is transformed into a dialectical paradigm of existence where 
each produces the other, constantly changing in response to the contradictory 
pressure of body and soul. In the vision of the fool these are not binary 
alternatives but rather the essence of what it is to be human – no stars without 
a gutter from which to glimpse them. [slide 7: clown crucifiction] The capacity of the 
medieval artist to depict the sacred in the profane and vice versa is nowhere 
better illustrated than in The Second Shepherds’ Play from the Wakefield Cycle 
of English Mystery Plays. These cycles dramatised the full biblical journey from 
Genesis to Revelations. The Second Shepherds’ Play is the pageant showing the 
annunciation of Christ’s birth to the shepherds and their subsequent act of 
worship in the stable. But of its 754 lines only the final 116 are concerned with 
these events. Those preceding start by articulating the grievances and trials of 
three shepherds in fifteenth century Yorkshire before going on to depict the 
theft of a sheep by a well-known local charleton called Mak who hides the 
stolen property in a crib in his hut under the pretence that Gyll, his wife, has 
just given birth. The insertion of the counter-narrative of Mak and Gyll is a 
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burlesque of a nativity built around the metaphor of Christ as the lamb of God. 
In this carnival version Mak plays the role of Joseph and Gyll is Mary, with the 
lamb of God being a stolen sheep. Joseph is transformed into a thief and 
trickster, the Virgin Mary into a fecund hag who produces children at least 
once a year and even the innocent lamb becomes a fat, foul-smelling ewe. The 
stage-craft of the pageant further laminates one reality onto another with the 
hut of Mak and Gyll doubling as the stable in Bethlehem (appropriate setting 
for a sheep) and the actors of Mak and Gyll doubling as Mary and Joseph (if the 
latter was impersonated). Alternatively it might be that the actor of Mak 
makes a swift costume change to reappear as the Angel while the shepherds 
sleep, repeating his earlier appearance among the sleeping trio; once to 
remove a sheep from their care and a second time to direct them to the lamb 
who will perform the role of good shepherd in rounding up the lost souls of 
humanity. [slide 8: nativity] The shepherds are and are not themselves throughout 
for in the final ‘official’ scene they are simultaneously the shepherds at the first 
Nativity, Yorkshire shepherds in the year of the play’s performance and poor 
folk to whom Christ’s birth is announced afresh each year; quarrelling, hungry, 
oppressed and oppressing workers and innocent souls in receipt of divine 
revelation. The logic of the grim lives represented until this point in the play 
would lead to the hanging of Mak as a sheep stealer but instead the shepherds 
are touched by the divine spirit of forgiveness while the actors of their roles 
are equally touched by the spirit of game or holiday and opt to toss Mak in a 
blanket. Even in this moment the artistry of the burlesque holds for the 
punishment meted out to Mak, itself a substitute for death, is also a method 
used to induce birth. Beside prefiguring the news of Christ’s birth the ritual 
also conforms to carnivalesque practice where violence leads directly to 
regeneration. Mak is thus a type of mock scapegoat or winter king who is 
beaten out at the darkest moment of the year in order that new life can 
emerge as the light grows stronger. His ‘child’ and the baby Jesus are alike 
addressed by the term ‘day-star’.  
 
[slide 9: Dario Fo in Mistero Buffo] 
This notion of locating folly at the core of the most sacred myths cherished by 
societies through a grassroots lens has been taken up in our times by Dario Fo 
in his own one-man mystery cycle, Mistero Buffo, ‘Fool’s Mystery’. For 
example, in the sketch of ‘The Blind Man and the Cripple’ Jesus’ propensity for 
performing miracles puts their livlihood in jeopardy: 
 
The Blind Man: Well, I think we should go and see this saint, so he can lift us out of our 
wretched condition. 
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The Cripple: Are you serious? You’ll end up getting miracled, and then you’ll die of 
hunger, because everybody will tell you: ‘Go to work…’ 
 
The Blind Man: Oh, it puts me into a cold sweat just to think of it… 
 
The Cripple: ‘Go to work, vagabond,’ they will say. ‘People who don’t work should go to 
prison…’ And that way you will lose that great privilege which we share with 
the lords and the masters, of collecting tithes. They use the tricks of the law, 
and we make use of pity. (Fo, 1988: 31) 
 
Through the inversion of conventional wisdom the real structures of power are 
laid bare playfully. Hyde’s analysis of the relation of the shaman to the trickster 
captures something of the discourse with which Fo is playing: 
 
The shaman may well have the strong belief that allows him to operate in the world of the 
spirits, but belief is single-minded and cannot do what trickster does, open the corridors of 
humor that allow the mind to toy with itself and with its creations. Along with the revelation 
of plenitude, then, comes revelation of a complex, joint-working consciousness, one that can 
always find those corridors of humor, one that will play with any concept, no matter how 
serious it seems…, and one that can create new artifice if need be, that can turn to shaping 
when it tires of shifting.  (Hyde, 1999: 297)  
 
Raining Everyday   
 
               The immense tragedy for Europeans, and most acutely for the northern Protestants 
 among them, was that the same social forces that disposed them to depression also 
 swept away a traditional cure. They could congratulate themselves for brilliant 
 achievements in the areas of science, exploration and industry, and even convince 
 themselves that they had not, like Faust, had to sell their souls to the devil in  
              exchange for these accomplishments. But with the suppression of festivities that 
 accompanied modern European “progress”, they had done something perhaps far  
 more damaging: they had completed the demonisation of Dionysus begun by 
 Christians centuries ago. (Ehrenreich, 2007: ??) 
Shakespeare’s plays sit on the cusp of the late medieval and early modern 
worlds and on the religious fault line of Reformation and Counter-Reformation. 
Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the change from clown to fool, 
provoked by the exit of Will Kempe and the entrance of Robert Armin in 1599. 
The exuberant, street-based physical performer, Kempe, gave way to the  text-
bound, wistful musician and professional fool, Armin. The fools of 
Shakespeare’s later plays, notably Feste and Lear’s Fool, at once display 
elements of their medieval antecedents – detached, prophetic, nostalgic – and 
of more modern preoccupations – political, psychological, metaphysical. [slide 
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10: Feste & Olivia] Besides his songs which act as ironic distillations of the dramatic 
moment (‘youth’s a stuff will not endure’), Feste also exposes false emotion 
and conventional posturing as in the early exchange with Olivia: 
 CLOWN: good Madonna, give me leave to prove you a fool. 
 OLIVIA:  Can you do it? 
 CLOWN: Dexteriously, good Madonna. 
 OLIVIA:  Make your proof. 
 CLOWN: I must catechize you for it Madonna. Good my Mouse of virtue answer me. 
 OLIVIA:  Well sir, for want of other idleness, I’ll bide your proof. 
 CLOWN: Good Madonna, why mourn’st thou? 
 OLIVIA:  Good fool, for my brother’s death. 
 CLOWN: I think his soul is in hell, Madonna. 
 OLIVIA:  I know his soul is in heaven, fool. 
CLOWN: The more fool, Madonna, to mourn for your brother’s soul, being in heaven.      
Take away the fool, gentlemen.   (I, 5) 
Feste constantly separates conventional posture from genuine emotion in all 
the characters he encounters in a play of affectation and madness. He 
punctures their fantasies with the nimble prick of his lance of realism, honed 
on years of observation of human follies. The climax of the fantastic is the 
socially conventional double wedding enabled by the discovery of the identical 
twin, thereby conveniently side-stepping the potentially subversive 
consequences of homo-erotic desire. But as the rest of the cast trip off to 
celebrate, Feste is left alone on stage to return the audience to the world 
beyond the theatre: 
   When that I was and a little tiny boy, 
    With hey ho, the wind and the rain: 
   A foolish thing was but a toy, 
    For the rain it raineth every day. 
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   But when I came to man’s estate 
    With hey ho, the wind and the rain: 
   ‘Gainst knaves and thieves men shut their gate, 
    For the rain it raineth every day.  (V, 1) 
Feste’s epilogue signals a number of the core functions of the fool. His song’s 
direct address to the audience places him between the worlds of the stage 
fiction and of the auditorium’s reality. He thus recovers the ancient function of 
Hermes, messenger of the gods, not only commuting but also interpreting 
between two worlds. In doing so Feste becomes semi-detached from the play 
in which he has just appeared, undermining the willing suspension of disbelief 
while reminding us of the play’s alternative title, What You Will. Shakespeare 
has given the punters what they want but the fool knows it has no currency 
outside the theatre. Viewed from the historical perspective of the turn to the 
new century, the Epilogue also sits on the cusp of the transition from the late 
medieval period into the early modern: not only redolent of the fool’s 
conservative nostalgia for vanishing discourses but also casting doubt upon the 
myth of progress with its confident assertion of the perfectability of human 
nature. 
Shakespeare explores the same trope in tragic mode through the function of 
Lear’s Fool who repeats the same song as that sung by Feste in his Epilogue. 
But whereas Feste remains essentially an external commentator on the follies 
of Illyria, in King Lear the Fool’s world-view is taken into the heart of the 
action. [slide 11: Lear as fool] Fools playing at being kings were a commonplace of 
medieval culture. Shakespeare’s boldness is having a king playing the fool, both 
natural and professional. Throughout the earlier scenes the Fool’s dialogue 
with Lear is directed at raising Lear’s awareness of the consequences of 
separating the function of kingship from its form: 
 FOOL:   That lord that counsell’d thee 
          To give away thy land, 
    Come place him here by me –  
          Do thou for him stand. 
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    The sweet and bitter fool 
          Will presently appear; 
    The one in motley here, 
          The other found out there. 
 LEAR: Dost thou call me fool, boy? 
 FOOL: All thy other titles thou hast given away; that thou wast born with. 
Part of Lear’s transformation back to the condition of his birth is his 
rediscovery of his inner fool: that quality of seeing how the world actually 
works rather than how we might wish it to work. This process is rendered 
physical with the disappearance of the Fool from the play, or, more precisely, 
the absorption of him into the person of Lear who becomes his own fool. The 
metaphysical transition is established in the climactic confrontation with the 
blind Gloucester. The play demonstrates the corruptibility of power and the 
inability of humans to govern themselves justly. Lear articulates the theme 
with all the clarity and concreteness of a born fool: 
 LEAR: Thou hast seen a farmer’s dog bark at a beggar? 
  And the creature run from the cur? 
  There mightst behold the great image of authority: a dog’s obeyed in office.  (IV, 6) 
The fool has a function but no status or rank. She gazes, therefore, clear-eyed 
upon the foibles of those who pursue ambition and preferment at the cost of 
their judgement, their well-being, and ultimately their lives. She requires us to 
confront our mortality and, in doing so, to ask ourselves how we should live so 
that a society can flourish. 
The Joke of Contradiction 
The theatre of the scientific age is in a position to make dialectics into a source of 
enjoyment. The unexpectedness of logically progressive or zigzag development, the 
instability of every circumstance, the joke of contradiction and so forth: all these are ways of 
enjoying the liveliness of men, things and processes, and they heighten both our capacity for 
life and our pleasure in it. (Willett, 1978: 277) 
So wrote German playwright Bertolt Brecht, looking back on his lifetime in the 
theatre. The phrase ‘the joke of contradiction’ neatly expresses the dual notion 
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of contradiction as the motor of social change (derived from Brecht’s study of 
Marx) and the playful consequences unleashed by a foolish understanding of 
its operation. In his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach Marx wrote that ‘the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to 
change it’ (McLellan, 1980: 156). Brecht made this dictum the core of his 
practice: ‘I wanted to take the principle that it was not just a matter of 
interpreting the world but of changing it, and apply that to the theatre’ 
(Willett, 1978: 248). A dialectical view of material reality holds that every 
condition, however secure it may try to appear, contains the seed of the 
contradiction that, sooner or later, will bring about, willingly or unwillingly, its 
demise or evolution into a new condition. Such a view is anathema to those 
with a vested interest in the status quo: politicians, business tycoons, 
celebrities. Change, whether progressive or conservative, tends therefore to be 
located at the popular, grassroots levels of societies where the failings and 
corruptions of our leaders are played out in carnivalesque fashion. This idea of 
a second or parallel world of carnival was articulated in the last century by the 
Russian cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin: 
The serious aspects of class culture are official and authoritarian; they are combined with 
violence, prohibitions, limitations and always contain an element of fear and intimidation. 
These elements prevailed in the Middle Ages. Laughter, on the contrary, overcomes fear, for 
it knows no inhibitions, no limitations. Its idiom is never used by violence and authority. 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 90) 
Brecht brings together these two impulses, for change and carnival, in his 
parable for the theatre, The Caucasian Chalk Circle. Specifically, they merge in 
the character of the people’s carnival judge, Azdak. [slide 12: Azdak as fool] The 
violence of authority is temporarily arrested by the intervention of Azdak into 
the discourses of power, achieved by his nimble wit and capacity for play-
acting. Once there, his judgements, though corrupt, for justice is unattainable, 
always favour those who stand in material need of justice as the hungry need 
food. Though he cannot change the world single-handed, the fool as judge 
enables the test of the chalk circle to produce a morally correct rather than 
politically expedient outcome. Brecht’s note for the actor playing Azdak is 
telling: 
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a man of utterly unblemished character, a disappointed revolutionary who plays the part of 
a man gone to the dogs, just as in Shakespeare wise men play the part of fools. (Brecht, 
1994: 302) 
As in a Shakespeare comedy, The Caucasian Chalk Circle ends with a marriage 
celebration and a dance. Like Feste, Azdak is once more alone to contemplate 
the happiness of others but the stagecraft inverts the final moments of Twelfth 
Night. This time the fool disappears behind the celebrants rather than the 
celebrants behind the fool. 
 And after that evening Azdak vanished and was never seen again. 
 The people of Grusinia did not forget him but long remembered 
 The period of his judging as a brief golden age. 
 Almost an age of justice.  (Brecht, 1966: 207) 
  
Because ‘the rain it raineth every day’ there can be no perfectability, no time 
exempt from the process of change – hence ‘a brief golden age’; no absolutes 
governing the human condition – hence ‘almost an age of justice’. Plays cannot 
make social interventions but perhaps they can speak to those who have a 
mind not to accept the familiar, unjust world into which they are born; perhaps 
they speak to the ‘disappointed’ to remind them that they are not alone; not 
for comfort or therapy but so that the weight of that disappointment 
eventually leads to an intervention which produces social transformation. If 
even this claim appears, in an age of neoliberal individualism, to be absurdly 
utopian, at least fooling with the contradictions within the oppressive state 
apparatus enables us to participate more fully, to take more pleasure in being 
alive. 
Poetics are every bit as important as politics in this process of participation; 
hence Brecht’s development of the aesthetic of epic realism as a means of 
laying bare the inner workings or deep structures of power. Naturalism, the 
dominant genre through which we consume hours of television drama, reflects 
surface reality back at us; it proclaims ‘this is how things are’ with the implicit 
assumption that change beyond a token level of reformism, is impossible. 
Those who inhabit and profit from the status quo find in this aesthetic the 
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justification for their dominance. In his own day Brecht felt the need to use 
forms that could counter naturalism and hence developed his 
Verfremdungseffekte, his devices for rendering the familiar strange. Given the 
sophistication of contemporary satellite and digital technologies, how much 
more urgent is the task of exploiting forms that can expose the lazy 
assumptions, the common sense, the ‘no-brainers’ of our breaking news 
culture. Bakhtin believed that such forms exist among popular celebrations of 
grassroots identities, closely related to the expression of folly: 
…popular-festive images became a powerful means of grasping reality; they served as a basis 
for an authentic and deep realism. Popular imagery did not reflect the naturalistic, fleeting, 
meaningless, and scattered aspect of reality but the very process of becoming, its meaning 
and direction. (Bakhtin, 1984: 211-12) 
This is why the fool tends towards the grotesque, the carnivalesque, and song. 
His very appearance militates against naturalistic interpretation. But don’t be 
fooled: the fool’s distortion of surface reality is the ironic strategy adopted to 
get under the skin of the body politic since, in Brecht’s words, ‘taught only by 
reality can reality be changed’ (Brecht, 1977: 34) 
Where Has All The Folly Gone? 
The latest incarnation of neoliberalism is austerity; a strategy dreamed up by 
financiers and administered by politicians to transfer wealth from the already 
poor to the already rich. In such a context it becomes increasingly difficult to 
locate pockets of foolish resistance among the impoverished and dispossessed 
who represent ever greater proportions of societies across the globe. Given 
that the dominant discourse of the so-called ‘developed’ world is an austerity 
manifested in material inequality and injustice – spectacular greed for a 
minority with access to finance, matched by a sharp increase in psycho-social 
insecurity for the majority – then any attempts to oppose this narrative need 
to be grounded in what Bakhtin called ‘popular-festive forms’ which I’m pulling 
together under the general term of ‘foolishness’. 
There are two broad areas where the folly that creates resistance can be 
nurtured: education and politics. In his recent book, Creative Schools, Ken 
Robinson draws attention to the work of Peter Gray, a psychology professor at 
Boston College who has studied the findings of anthropologists who have 
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investigated children’s unsupervised play in hunter-gatherer societies. In 
Gray’s words: 
Some of these anthropologists told us that the children they observed in these cultures are 
among the brightest, happiest, most cooperative, most well-adjusted, most resilient children 
that they had ever observed anywhere…So from a biological evolutionary perspective, play is 
nature’s means of insuring that young mammals, including young human beings, acquire the 
skills that they need to acquire to develop successfully into adulthood. (Robinson, 2015: 95) 
Extrapolating from these findings, Gray goes on to suggest that the importance 
of free play extends well beyond the areas embraced by any narrow definition 
of skills: 
Free play is the means by which children learn to make friends, overcome their fears, solve 
their own problems, and generally take control of their own lives. It is also the primary 
means by which children practice [sic.] and acquire the physical and intellectual skills that 
are essential for success in the culture in which they are growing. Nothing that we do, no 
amount of toys we buy or ‘quality time’ or special training we give our children, can 
compensate for the freedom we take away. The things that children learn through their own 
initiatives, in free play, cannot be taught in other ways. (Robinson, 2015: 95-6) 
What is this ‘free play’ if not the practice of drama? Whether applied to young 
people or to adults, the process being engaged in is that of matching their 
experiences, either lived or observed, with socio-cultural expectations. They 
are trying themselves out against the world and, in places where they do not 
fit, seeing whether the application of imagination might lead to social changes 
in line with felt experience. The conditions which enable free play to thrive are 
nowhere to be found among neoliberal concepts of education. What Robinson 
calls the industrial model of education with its misguided belief in uniform 
standards of learning and its obsession with testing, is the polar opposite of a 
notion of child-centred learning based on the myriad ways in which the self 
negotiates with the external world. However, for better or worse, very few of 
us now live in hunter-gatherer societies. Whatever spaces we can preserve for 
free play are likely to be limited and ephemeral. Therefore, within the places of 
formal and informal education the teacher/facilitator has a vital role to 
perform in the structuring of transitions from free play into the socio-political 
cultures in which young people have to live without curtailing young people’s 
access to the folly that nourishes personal well-being and social alternatives. 
[slide 13: Rev. Billy televangelist] 
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In the realm of politics there are pockets of resistance or pin-pricks of light 
flickering in the great darkness of this ‘naughty world’. One such example is the 
anti-consumerist clown at the heart of that most consumerist of societies, the 
USA, the Reverend Billy. Bill Talen selected a persona which would 
simultaneously echo a well-known, popular type in their societies – 
televangelist – whilst simultaneously being an ironic or parodic version of that 
type. Much of the energy of Talen’s interventions into the dark hearts of 
consumerism stem from his ability to become Reverend Billy rather than take 
on a character in the manner of conventional performance. Even as ‘himself’ in 
conversation, Bill Talen’s overlap with the Reverend Billy overflows into his 
discourse: [slide 14: Rev. Billy] 
Life, life! We believe in life and wonder! We all have that voice in the back of our brains that 
is marveling [sic] at life every second of every day. Because it is amazing, isn’t it? Even the 
most cynical people have this question going on. So engaging that voice, letting that 
question – what is life? – get aired out once in a while, will make you jump and shout and do 
the damndest things. That’s what we do in our church. We don’t want that deity with the 
answers. We want that life with the questions. Amen? (Savitri, 2011:224) 
The Reverend Billy exploits the religious thrill, the force of being a 
congregation but then diverts the torrent away from blueprints for a right-wing 
ideology in this life and the life to come and substitutes a questioning, an 
exposing of the contradictions of a society which leaves us dying of 
consumption. In other words the Reverend Billy is a means of gaining access to 
powerful conservative discourses in US society in order to undo them from 
within, like Azdak as judge.  
There are connections to be made between aspects of the Reverend Billy 
project and the interventions of Bepe Grillo and his Five Star Movement on the 
stage of Italian national politics. [slide 15: Grillo with lap-top] In both cases a 
reconceptualising of civic and national futures without recourse to traditional 
political structures is under way. The immediacy of performance, particularly 
comic performance, is being invoked as a potent communication with ordinary 
people that throws into relief the constant failure of the political establishment 
to find a language through which to talk to its electorates. On a grand scale 
figures like Reverend Billy and Bepe Grillo are archetypes of the foolish 
facilitator, enthusing their participants/followers/audiences with utopian 
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visions and the audacity to dream of social change. Grillo’s links to Italy’s 
medieval past have been made explicit by Dario Fo who has, over many years, 
fashioned himself as a latter day giullaro; the storyteller, clown, wandering 
minstrel who employed his performance skills in the service of criticising the 
powerful in church and state on behalf of the peasants. 
Grillo rose to fame mixing comedy routines with references to political scandals in the towns 
he was playing in, a straight lift from his medieval peers. “He is from the tradition of the wise 
storyteller, one who knows how to use surreal fantasy, who can turn situations around, who 
has the right word for the right moment, who can transfix people when he speaks, even in 
the rain and the snow,” explains Fo…. (Tom Kington, The Observer, 3 March 2013) 
The Five Star movement may never take up positions within the formal 
political structures nor Grillo become prime minister and perhaps the fool 
should never aspire to do so lest she lose her function, but the intervention is 
nevertheless of a magnitude that demonstrates to an erstwhile neglected 
electorate that there are other, more democratic ways of organising political 
life.  
Long ago fools were the property of monarchs and nobles; today they must tell 
their ironic, paradoxical truths in the courts of the fossil fuel giants, the 
bankers and their hand-maidens in national government. When they are 
reluctant to listen, still less participate in applied theatre workshops, let the 
foolish facilitators, like medieval fools before them, take to the streets and 
public places to mobilise the forces of social power against which the mightiest 
oligarchs crumble. [slide 16: climate change 1] Naomi Klein concludes This Changes 
Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate thus: 
 We are also significantly less isolated than many of us were even a decade ago: the 
 new structures built in the rubble of neoliberalism – everything from social media to  
 worker co-ops to farmer’s markets to neighborhood sharing banks – have helped us 
 to find community despite the fragmentation of postmodern life….these moments  
 when the impossible seems suddenly possible are excruciatingly rare and precious. 
 (Klein, 2014, 466) 
[slide 17: climate change 2] 
When the contradictions move towards crisis point, the fool’s wisdom opens 
up possibilities for our survival, previously denied by the prevailing common 
sense. Though we may be some distance away from slaughtering the sacred 
cow of capitalism, we are not impotent. John Holloway urges us to 
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Fight from the particular, fight from where we are, here and now. Create spaces or moments 
of otherness, spaces or moments that walk in the opposite direction, that do not fit in. Make 
holes in our own reiterative creating of capitalism. Create cracks and let them expand, let 
them multiply, let them resonate, let them flow together. (Holloway, 2010: 261) 
As the fool might put it: ‘blessed are the cracked for they shall let in the light’. 
Since the sixteenth century we have been assailed by the siren voices of the 
white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ascendancy, so I’ll conclude with the words of 
Tomson Highway who articulates a culture that has folly at its heart: [slide 18: 
coyote as trickster] 
At all times I have had the Trickster sitting beside me. In Cree we call him/her Weesageechak 
– the being who inhabits that area of our dream world, our subconscious, where we connect 
with the Great Spirit, with God. As with every mythology the world over, she/he – in Cree, 
there is no gender – is the central hero figure, that essential link, who exists to teach us 
about the nature and the meaning of existence on the planet Earth. It is just unfortunate 
that his/her first meeting, seven lifetimes ago, with the central hero figure from that other 
mythology – Christian mythology – was so shocking and resulted in so many unpleasant 
occurrences. 
But we of this generation are fixing that. Ever so little by little, we are picking the Trickster, 
that ancient clown, up from under that legendary beer table on Main Street in Winnipeg or 
Hastings Street in Vancouver, and will soon have her standing firmly up on his own two feet 
so she can make us laugh and dance again. Because, contrary to the viewpoint presented by 
that other hero figure, what she says foremost is that we are here to have one hell of a good 
time. (York, 1992: ix) 
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